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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
In Roe v. Wa"' a pregnant single woman brought
a class action against the Texas criminal abortion
statute which only allowed abortions "for the pur-
pose of saving the life of the mother." 
2
Confronted with one of the most emotional and
controversial issues ever before the Supreme Court
of the United States-the right of a woman to
abort an unborn fetus-Justice Blackmun's ma-
jority opinion relied heavily on current medical
knowledge in delineating the various interests in-
volved in the abortion decision. Holding the statute
unconstitutionally overbroad, the Court ruled that
the abortion decision is entirely within the province
of the woman and her doctor during the first three
months of pregnancy. State interests in the second
trimester were linited to regulation of abortion
procedures to protect the health of the mother.
Once the fetus reaches viability during the third
trimester, however, the Court held that the state
has a legitimate interest in prohibiting any abortion
other than one to preserve the life or health of the
mother.
The Court in Doe v. Bolfon,' a companion case,
dealt with various procedural requirements im-
posed by the State of Georgia upon persons seeking
abortions. 4 While striking down provisions requir-
ing that (1) the hospital performing the abortion
be accredited by the Joint Committee on Accredita-
tion of Hospitals, (2) the abortion be approved by
a hospital abortion committee, and (3) judgment
of the patient's physician be confirmed by two
other doctors, the Court upheld the hospitals right
to decide whether it would allow abortions and the
1410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 VmwoN's ANN. Tx. P. C. art. 1191-94, 1196
(1961).
3410 U.S. 179 (1973).
4The Georgia abortion statute, GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 26-1201-03 (1968), was patterned after the ALI
Model Penal Code which suggests allowing abor-
tions in three situations (see n. 6 and text infra).
The limitation of abortions to those specific situations
was held invalid by a federal district court but that
court refused to strike down other provisions regulat-
ing the manner of making the decision to abort as well
as the performance of the abortion. 319 F. Supp. 1048
(N.D. Ga. 1970). Due to an appeal by the defendants
pending before the Fifth Circuit on the portion of the
statute held unconstitutional, the Supreme Court in
Doe v. Bolton confined its examination to the issues
raised by the plaintiffs' appeal challenging the con-
stitutionality of those remaining procedural provisions.
right of physicians and hospital employees to
refrain from participating in such operations for
moral or religious reasons.
Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinions, supported by
six other Justices of the Court,' mark an expansion
of an individual's right to personal privacy, as well
as a possible rejuvenation of the concept of sub-
stantive due process.
The movement for more liberal abortion laws
undoubtedly received much of its impetus in 1962
when Sherri Finkbine made her highly publicized
trip to Sweden to have her thalidomide-deformed
fetus aborted. At that time virtually all of the
states prohibited abortion except to save or pre-
serve the life of the mother, while the remaining
few states allowed abortions to preserve the
mother's health.' The Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute which was proposed later
that year, however, contained provisions permit-
ting abortions if the doctor believes there is a
substantial risk that (1) continuance of the preg-
nancy would gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother, (2) the child would be born
with a grave physical or mental defect or (3) the
pregnancy resulted from rape, incest or other
felonious intercourse 7 The first state to pattern a
statute after this suggested provision was Colorado
in 1967. Almost one-third of the states had similar
abortion statutes when Jane Roe brought her ac-
tion against the Texas abortion statute in March
1970. 9 Twenty-one other states, in contrast, then
had criminal abortion statutes on their books which
were passed between 1835 and 1868.10 By the end
of 1970 only four states had repealed criminal
penalties for abortions performed in the early
states of pregnancy. n
' Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the
Court in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell
joined. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas and
Stewart filed concurring opinions. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion.
6 410 U.S. at 139 nn. 34, 35.
7 MODEL P AL CoDE, § 230.3 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).
8 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2-50 to 53 (Penn.
Cum. Supp. 1967).
9 410 U.S. at 140 n.37.
10 Id. at 176-77 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
i Id. at 140 n.37.
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This divergent treatment of the abortion ques-
tion is reflected in court decisions involving such
statutes.12 Since 1969, seven state laws prohibiting
abortions except for preserving the life of the
mother have been held unconstitutional by federal
district and state supreme courts, 3 while seven
similar state statutes have been upheld 4 In addi-
tion, two state laws modeled after the Model Penal
Code were held constitutional 15 while one was held
unconstitutional. 6
People v. Belous,17 decided by the California
supreme court in 1969, was the first decision to
12The Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), apparently added to the
confusion. In that case the Court reversed a district
court's ruling that a District of Columbia criminal
abortion statute was unconstitutionally vague in its
exception permitting abortions when necessary to
preserve the mother's life or health. As a result, some
courts and legal scholars felt the Supreme Court was
"of no mind to strike down all substantive limitations
on abortions." Sigworth, Abortion Laws in the Federal
Courts-the Supreme Court as Supreme Platonic Cuard-
ian, 5 IND. L G. F. 130, 133 (1971). The Vuitch Court,
however, did qualify the statute by (1) placing the
burden on the prosecution to prove that a physician's
decision was not within the statutory exception, (2)
requiring an implied presumption that the physician
acted in good faith and (3) interpreting health to
include mental health. The Florida supreme court, as a
consequence, held in State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1972), that the state abortion statute was un-
constitutionally vague, but cited Vuilch as the primary
support for its dicta:
If the statutes contained a clause reading 'neces-
sary to the preservation of the mother's life or
health' instead of the clause 'necessary to pre-
serve the life,' the statutes could be held con-
stitutional.
262 So. 2d at 433.
A reading of the Vuitch opinion, however, indicates
that it is not inconsistent with Roe since the Court in
Vuitch specifically stated it had only dealt with the
vagueness issue, thus bypassing privacy arguments
based on Griswold.
'1 Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D. N.J.
1972); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn.
1972); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill.
1971); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Texas
1970); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D.
Wis. 1970); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458
P.2d 194 (1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 915 (1970); State
v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972).
1" Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587
(E.D. Ky. 1972); Doe v. Rampton, - F. Supp.
(D. Utah 1971); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp.
741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Rosen v. La. State, 318 F.
Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970); Cheaney v. Indiana,
285 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. 1972); State v. Abodeely, 179
N.W.2d 347 (Iowa 1970); State v. Munson, 201
N.W.2d 123 (S.D. 1972).
16 Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C.
1971); Spears v. State, 257 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1972).
" Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga.
1970).
17 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1969).
declare a criminal abortion statute unconstitutional
and its reasoning is typical of similar holdings
which followed. The California court found:
The fundamental right of the woman to choose
whether to bear children follows from the Supreme
Court's 'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters
related to marriage, family, and sex."
Then, stating that a compelling state interest is
necessary to override a fundamental right, the
court acknowledged the state interest in protecting
the health of the pregnant mother but found it
insufficient to outweigh the countervailing right to
privacy of the woman.
Because the California Legislature amended its
abortion statute subsequent to the filing of Dr.
Belous' action,"9 the Belous court merely held the
old statute unconstitutional. Noting that thera-
peutic abortions in the first trimester are safer
than childbirth, the court commented that the
legislative intent to protect the mother might be
fulfilled by permitting abortions when their mortal-
ity rate is less than that of childbirth. Four other
courts which held abortion statutes unconstitu-
tional reasoned in a similar manner and limited
abortions to the early stages of pregnancy.
20
Most of the courts which upheld abortion laws
recognized a woman's right to privacy and then
asked whether a compelling state interest exists to
justify abridging such a right. The "potential to
become a person," 21 the "universal belief in the
sanctity of human life; ... potential or other-
wise," 2 and the constitutional rights of the fetus
as a person,2 were among the interests which those
courts found to be superior to the pregnant
woman's right to personal privacy. Several of the
courts which refused to hold abortion laws uncon-
18 Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
11CA . HEAnIT & SASETY CODE §§ 25955.5-
25959 (West Supp. 1972).
20Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1072
(D. N.J. 1972) ("in its early stages"); Abele v. Markle,
342 F. Supp. 800, 804 (D. Conn. 1972) ("within an
appropriate period after conception"); Doe v. Scott,
321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (N.D. Ill. 1971) ("at least
during the first trimester"); Babbitz v. McCann, 310
F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970) ("four months or
less"). The decision in State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d
431 (Fla. 1972), achieved virtually the same result by
holding the entire Florida abortion law unconstitu-
tional, thereby allowing the common law to become
applicable.
"1 State v. Munson, 201 N.W.2d 123,127 (S.D.1972).
12 Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587,
591 (E.D. Ky. 1972).
2Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D.
Ohio 1970).
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stitutional specified that any changes in those
statutes would have to be made by their state
legislatures,4 though one expressed the belief that
the statute needed reform 25
The central issue of the abortion cases, therefore,
involves the weighing of the woman's right to
personal privacy which encompasses the right to
terminate her pregnancy against the right to life
of the *fetus as well as the State's concern for the
mother's, health and for potential human life. The
willingness of a court to perform such a balancing,
rather than to leave it for a legislative determina-
tion, also was a factor.
Roe presented these issues squarely before
the Supreme Court. Jane Roe, a pregnant single
woman, brought a class action seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion
laws were an unconstitutional violation of her right
to choose to terminate her pregnancy; she also
sought an injunction restraining the defendant, a
county district attorney, from enforcing the stat-
utes. She based her claimed right on the concept of
personal liberty found in the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the right to privacy
protected by the Bill of Rights and its penumbras
as recognized in Griswold v. Connecticult,2 6 or the
rights .reserved to the people by the ninth amend-
ment.
A three-judge district court declared the Texas
statute void for vagueness and overbreadth.n It
held that the choice of whether to have children is
a fundamental right of single women and married
couples protected by the ninth amendment through
the fourteenth amendment. The court did not make
any detailed inquiry into countervailing state
interests, stating that "even compelling state
interests will not save it from the consequences of
unconstitutional overbreadth." 2 The judges re-
fused to provide any guidelines for abortion deci-
sions, finding it "sufficient to state that legislation
concerning abortion must address itself to more
than a bare negation of that right." '
The Supreme Court's approach was somewhat
different. After resolving the questions of standing
and justiciability, Justice Blackmun's majority
24 Cheaney v. Indiana, 285 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ind.
1972); State v. Munson, 201 N.W.2d 123, 127 (S.D.
1972).
25 Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587,
591 (E.D. Ky. 1972).
26381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Roev. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
28Id. at 1223.
"Id. at 1224.
decision surveyed the history "of man's attitudes
toward the abortion procedures over the cen-
turies," 11 beginning with ancient attitudes and
working through the common law to English and
American statutory law in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. The purpose of this back-
ground was apparently to show the historical dis-
tinctions between quickening, the first recognizable
movement of the fetus in utero occurring at ap-
proximately the 16th to 18th week of pregnancy,
and viability, the ability of the fetus to exist out-
side the mother's body beginning the 24th to 28th
week of pregnancy.n
The Court then outlined the various interests
arising out of the abortion decision. The pregnant
woman's interest was said to stem from her right to
personal privacy. Encompassed within this concept
of privacy are the fundamental rights to marry,
procreate, raise children and use contraceptives.
Contrary to the district court's focus on the ninth
amendment, the Court expressed its belief that this
right of privacy is "founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state actions ... [and is] broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy." 12
In an apparent attempt to provide some bound-
aries to this right of personal liberty, the Court
specified:
... it is not dear to us that the claim asserted by
some aniki that one has an unlimited right to do
with one's body as one pleases bears a close rela-.
tionship to the right of privacy previously ar-
ticulated in the Court's decisions."
As a consequence, the right had to be qualified and
considered against the other interests involved.
Because this right of privacy which includes the
decision to abort a pregnancy is fundamental, the
Court held that only a compelling state interest
and a narrowly drawn statute would justify its
regulation.31
Although the Court recognized that the fetus
itself would have a right to life if a "person" within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, it could
30 410 U.S. at 117.
"1 The survey also indicated that during most of
the nineteenth century "a woman enjoyed a sub-
stantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than
she does in most States today." Id. at 140.
-Id. at 153.
33Id. at 154.
34 The Court noted that these principles had been
applied in lower court decisions on the constitutionality
of abortion laws. Id. at 156.
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find no constitutional or common law basis for such
a contention. This conclusion, however, did not
provide an answer to Texas' argument that, not-
withstanding the fourteenth amendment, life be-
gins at conception and, therefore, the State has a
compelling interest in protecting that life. The
Court attempted to circumvent the religious and
moral problems presented by this contention with
the statement:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when
life begins. When those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy and theology
are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary
at this point in the development of man's knowl-
edge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer.35
The opinion then examined some of the situations
in which the unborn have been held to have legal
rights. Wrongful death cases for stillborn children
were distinguished by the fact that such actions
vindicate the interests of the parents. Similarly,
property rights of unborn children were distin-
guished because of the fact that a live birth gen-
erally is needed to perfect them. As a result, the
Court concluded, "the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense." 16
Modem medical techniques and statistics show-
ing mortality rates for normal childbirth to be
higher than rates for abortions in the early stages of
pregnancy were given as reasons for holding the
State's interest in the health of the mother to be
less than compelling in the first trimester. The
increase in mortality rates for abortions as preg-
nancy progresses results in a proportionate increase
in the state interest in protecting the mother.
The various interests of the State in the health
of the mother and in the potentiality of human life
become compelling at different points during the
pregnancy. At those points the State may impose
reasonable regulations to protect the particular
interest. Thus, the mother's interest predominates
in the first trimester. During that period the woman
and her physician are free to determine whether the
pregnancy should be terminated without regulation
by the State. Among the factors to be considered by
the physician and the mother at that time are the
possibility of "a distressful life and future" 7 for
the mother and the rest of her family and the
3 I1d. at 159.
36 Id. at 162.
3Id. at 153.
"problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for
it." Is The second trimester is a period in which the
state interest in the mother's health is substantial
enough to allow regulation of "the abortion proce-
dure to the extent that the regulation reasonably
relates to the preservation and protection of ma-
ternal health." 89 The state interest in potential
life becomes compelling when viability is attained,
allowing the State to "go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period except when it is neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the mother." 40
Finally, the Court held that states may prohibit
anyone but duly licensed physicians from perform-
ing abortions. The Texas statute was then held
unconstitutional for violating the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Before analyzing the Court's reasoning in Roe,
its decision in the companion case of Doe deserves
mention because of its elaboration on certain pro-
cedural requirements contained in abortion stat-
utes.A4
The Court held that the portion of the Georgia
statute requiring a doctor's "best clinical judgment
that an abortion is necessary"' 2 was not vague
because of the latitude given the physician in his
decision. As in Roe, a broad range of factors was
listed as bearing upon the physician's decision:
"physical, emotional, psychological, familial and
the woman's age... [a]U these factors may relate
to health." 3
The statute's required concurrence of two other
physicians" was ruled unconstitutional since no
other medical or surgical procedure necessitates
such a confirmation and because a licensed physi-
cian's best clinical judgment should be sufficient.
It should be noted, however, that the decision does
not strike the requirement that the doctor reduce
his decision to writing even though it is doubtful
that other medical or surgical procedures entail
such a report.
The requirement that the abortion be performed
in a hospital accredited by the joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals45 was held not to be
3 Id.
39 Id. at 163.
40 Id. at 163-64.
41See note 4 supra. In addition to Mary Doe, the
Court held that the physician-appellants had standing
and presented a justiciable controversy because of their
assertion of "a sufficiently direct threat of personal
detriment." 410 U.S. at 188.
" GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(a) (1968).
43 410 U.S. at 192.
44 GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(3) (1968).
45 Id. § 26-1202(b)(4).
[Vol. 64
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"reasonably related to the purposes of the Act." 46
The Court qualified this holding by suggesting that
reasonable standards for licensing facilities per-
forming abortions would be valid. The possibility
of a state requiring abortions to be performed
solely in licensed hospitals led to Justice Black-
mun's statement that
the State must show more than it has in order to
prove that only the full resources of a licensed
hospital, rather than those of some other appro-
priately licensed institution, satisfy these health
interests. 47
A provision in the statute requiring a hospital
committee's advance approval of all abortionso
was held to have no constitutional justification.
Such approval does not add to the protection of
potential life but merely limits the right of a woman
to receive medical care prescribed by her physician
and the right of her physician to administer that
care. In addition, other provisions protect the
interests of hospitals. A hospital, for instance, is
free to decide not to admit a patient seeking an
abortion.
49
Finally, the Court struck down a state residency
requirement 0 because it would not allow a State
to limit the use of its medical facilities to its own
residents.
While various points from the concurring and
dissenting opinions will be raised in an analysis of
the Court's reasoning in these cases (especially
Roe), a brief overview of those opinions seems
necessary. In his concurrence to Roe and Doe, Chief
Justice Burger expressed a belief that the decisions
will not result in abortion on demand because of
physicians' observance of the standards of their
profession. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion to
Roe welcomed the decision's reliance upon the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment rather
than upon Griswold's right of privacy. He candidly
wrote:
now ... the Griswold decision can be rationally
understood only as a holding that the Connecticut
statute substantively invaded the 'liberty' that is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.51
In his dissent to both decisions, Justice White
46 410 U.S. at 194.
7 Id. at 195.
4" GA. CODE ANx. § 26-1202(b)(5) (1968).
Id. § 26-1202 (e)
SId. §§ 26-1202 (b)(1)(b)(2).
1410 U.S. at 168.
labelled them "an improvident and extravagant
exercise of the power of judicial review" and indi-
cated the issue "should be left with the people and
to the political processes." 12 Dissents by Justice
Rehnquist in each case expressed disagreement
with the "compelling state interest" test, indicat-
ing that the proper test is whether the law "has a
rational relation to a valid state objective." 13 His
dissent to Roe also questioned whether the right to
abort an unborn fetus can be found in our society's
collective conscience (as required of all fundamen-
tal rights) because of legislation existing in most
states prohibiting abortions.
In order to evaluate the legal rationale behind
the Roe decision and to speculate about its future
impact upon the law, an examination of several
major aspects of the opinion is warranted, including
the Court's (1) apparent resort to a substantive
due process approach, (2) use of the concepts of
privacy and liberty and (3) treatment of the
woman's right to abort as a fundamental right
which can only be denied by a compelling state
interest.
As pointed out by Justices Stewart and Rehn-
quist, the result reached by the Court in these
decisions required an approach similar to that of
substantive due process. The doctrine of substan-
tive due process evolved during an era of the
Court's history when it was willing to substitute
its own "social and economic beliefs for the judg-
ment of legislative bodies" -' by invalidating
various state regulations of business conditions.'5
Just as the Court then was charged with sitting as
a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legisla-
tion," 56 the weighing of the various interests and
the distinctions drawn between the three periods of
pregnancy make the abortion decisions susceptible
to a similar criticism. What makes the Supreme
Court more capable than a state legislature of
determining what particular set of medical facts
are significant for the abortion question? The mo-
ments of quickening and viability which are em-
uId. at 222.
aId. at 173.
"Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
55Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is a
case frequently cited as applying a substantive due
process test to invalidate social welfare legislation. It
involved a law establishing maximum working hours
for bakeries. 5ee also Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (laws setting minimum wages for
women); Cop page v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (laws
invalidating "yellow dog" contracts which were em-
ployer-imposed agreements not to join a union).




phasized by the Court are actually quite variable,57
thus placing the decision on a questionable founda-
tion. What is a court to do, for instance, if medical
technology develops to the extent that viability is
attained earlier than the seventh month? Accord-
ing to the Court's rationale, an earlier viability date
would mean that the State's compelling interest in
the potential human life would occur earlier. A
state, therefore, would be able to prohibit abortions
at a date earlier than the one adopted in Roe.
Equally possible is a decrease in mortality rates for
abortions in later stages of pregnancy. When the
mortality rate becomes lower than that of natural
childbirth, the logic of the Roe opinion would put
the threshold of the State's interest in protecting
the mother's health at a later stage of pregnancy.
The possible confusion which could result is ob-
vious. An additional consideration is whether the
concept of viability will retain any significance as
medical advances occur in the areas of artificial
insemination and artificial wombs."
Another weakness is the lack of a constitutional
basis for the Court's discussion of the woman's
right to abort an unborn fetus which it believes is
encompassed within the concept of a right or
guarantee of personal privacy.
The right of privacy itself is a nebulous concept
due to its application in situations varying from
tort actions of defamation,5 9 to searches and sei-
zures, 60 to cases involving the use of contracep-
tives. 61 To include the right to an abortion within
this broad range, however, is not easy. Even the
Griswold decision, which went farthest in extending
the right of privacy from the "penumbras" of the
Bill of Rights, involved a right significantly differ-
ent from the one presented in Roe. As one state
supreme court commented,
Those cases [Griswold and Eisenstadt v. Baird] in-
volved the right to receive contraceptives while this
case involves abortion, the fundamental distinction
being the difference between prevention and destruc-
tion."
57 See, e.g., Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048,
1083 (D.N.J. 1972) (Garth, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
"In fact, Justice Blackmun recognized the progress
being made on those medical techniques. 410 U.S. at
161 n.62.
5"See generally PRossER, LAW oF ToRTs, 802-18
(4th ed. 1971).
60 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
61See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
2Cheaney v. Indiana, 285 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ind.
1972) (emphasis in original) referring to Griswold v.
Stated simply, the use of contraceptives discussed
in Griswold was confined to the privacy of the
marriage relationship, which involves "a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights... intimate
to the degree of being sacred." 6 The destruction
of an unborn fetus, on the other hand, involves, at
the very least, a pregnant woman, her doctor, and
a social and religious milieu which "strongly affirms
the sanctity of life." " To use Justice Blackmun's
own words, "The pregnant woman cannot be
isolated in her privacy." 65
In addition to this difficulty of fitting the right
to abort into past conceptions of privacy, the
Court's determination that it is a fundamental
right found in the concept of personal liberty of 'the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is
equally lacking of legal precedent. As the Court
itself recognized, 6 those rights deemed funda-
mental in the past- the right to raise children, 1 to
educate children,8 to procreate, 69 and to marry 7 --
are quite different from the right to terminate a
pregnancy. One basic difference is that those rights
are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 1
The same cannot be said about the-right to abort.
The Court's application of a compelling. state
interest test to determine whether a state interest
can abridge this "fundamental" right to terminate
a pregnancy is also subject to criticism. In the past,
legislation in the area of social welfare and eco-
nomics which came under attack on due process
grounds was subjected to a test of whether there is
a "reasonable basis" or a "rational relation" be-
tween the statute and its purposeY2 The stricter
compelling state interest test, in contrast, has been
reserved for first amendment" and equal protec-
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
6381 U.S. at 486.
64 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
15 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
66 Id.
67 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
11 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
6Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
10 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
7' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
72 See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491
(1955). One writer is especially critical of the fact that
a stricter test should be applied to abortion cases than
to Dandridge, which involved a statute limiting AFDC
payments. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 938-39 (1973).
73 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
Thomas v. Collins. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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